Jonas Geiping

2026

1. Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs

   Alexander Panfilov, David Schmotz, Ilia Shumailov, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Joachim Schaeffer, Ameya Prabhu, Jonas Geiping, and Maksym Andriushchenko

   arxiv:2608.09867[cs.CR], Aug 2026

   Abs

   Leading large language model providers now conceal their models’ step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider’s ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model’s reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model’s final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

2. Attractor States Emerge in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations

   Ting-Wen Ko, and Jonas Geiping

   arxiv:2606.30571[cs.LG], Jun 2026

   Abs

   Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in open-ended multi-agent settings, but the long-run dynamics of model–model interaction remain poorly understood. We study whether open-ended LLM discussions exhibit attractor-like behavior, i.e. topic-independent stable sets of behaviors which conversations settle into. Across 7 LLMs and 20 controversial topics, we compare self-play and mixed-play dyadic debates, tracking trajectories in representation space, discourse traits, and stances. We find self-play trajectories to be model-specific attractors that draw their conversation partners asymmetrically in mixed-play debates, influencing the other models’ stylistic choices and behavior. For example, Claude Haiku is a strong attractor of other models in latent space, corresponding to other models taking on its traits like metacommentary, and models like GPT-4.1 nano are especially malleable. Our results suggest that open-ended LLM interactions are partially predictable from model-specific attractors, but shaped by structured and asymmetric partner influence. Overall, our analysis sheds some light on the complex behavior of open-ended multi-agent interaction, which we hope is helpful in designing, predicting, and monitoring autonomous agentic systems in the real world.

3. Multi-Stream LLMs: Unblocking Language Models with Parallel Streams of Thoughts, Inputs and Outputs

   Guinan Su, Yanwu Yang, Xueyan Li, and Jonas Geiping

   arxiv:2605.12460[cs.LG], May 2026

   Abs

   The continued improvements in language model capability have unlocked their widespread use as drivers of autonomous agents, for example in coding or computer use applications. However, the core of these systems has not changed much since early instruction-tuned models like ChatGPT. Even advanced AI agents function on message exchange formats, successively exchanging messages with users, systems, with itself (i.e. chain-of-thought) and tools in a single stream of computation. This bottleneck to a single stream in chat models leads to a number of limitations: the agent cannot act (generate output) while reading, and in reverse, cannot react to new information while writing. Similarly, the agent cannot act while thinking and cannot think while reading or acting on information. In this work, we show that models can be unblocked by switching from instruction-tuning for sequential message formats to instruction-tuning for multiple, parallel streams of computation, splitting each role into a separate stream. Every forward pass of the language model then simultaneously reads from multiple input streams and generates tokens in multiple output streams, all of which causally depend on earlier timesteps. We argue that this data-driven change remedies a number of usability limitations as outlined above, improves model efficiency through parallelization, improves model security through better separation of concerns and can further improve model monitorability.

2025

1. Scaling up Test-Time Compute with Latent Reasoning: A Recurrent Depth Approach

   Jonas Geiping, Sean Michael McLeish, Neel Jain, John Kirchenbauer, Siddharth Singh, Brian R. Bartoldson, Bhavya Kailkhura, Abhinav Bhatele, and Tom Goldstein

   In The Thirty-ninth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, Oct 2025

   Abs

   We study a novel language model architecture that is capable of scaling test-time computation by implicitly reasoning in latent space. Our model works by iterating a recurrent block, thereby unrolling to arbitrary depth at test-time. This stands in contrast to mainstream reasoning models that scale up compute by producing more tokens. Unlike approaches based on chain-of-thought, our approach does not require any specialized training data, can work with small context windows, and can capture types of reasoning that are not easily represented in words. We train a proof-of-concept model from scratch with 3.5 billion parameters and 800 billion tokens. We show that this model can effortlessly use varying levels of compute, significantly improving with additional compute especially on reasoning tasks, such as math and coding. Further, this architecture naturally reduces compute costs via zero-shot per-token adaptive compute, KV-cache sharing and speculative decoding.

2. Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols

   Mikhail Terekhov, Alexander Panfilov, Daniil Dzenhaliou, Caglar Gulcehre, Maksym Andriushchenko, Ameya Prabhu, and Jonas Geiping

   In The Fourteenth International Conference on Learning Representations, Oct 2025

   Abs

   AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study \textit\textbraceleft adaptive\textbraceright attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-\n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

2024

1. Coercing LLMs to Do and Reveal (Almost) Anything

   Jonas Geiping, Alex Stein, Manli Shu, Khalid Saifullah, Yuxin Wen, and Tom Goldstein

   In SeT LLM @ ICLR 2024, Feb 2024

   Abs

   It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

2. Spotting LLMs With Binoculars: Zero-Shot Detection of Machine-Generated Text

   Abhimanyu Hans, Avi Schwarzschild, Valeriia Cherepanova, Hamid Kazemi, Aniruddha Saha, Micah Goldblum, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein

   In Proceedings of the Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, Jan 2024

   Abs

   Detecting text generated by modern large language models is thought to be hard, as both LLMs and humans can exhibit a wide range of complex behaviors. However, we find that a score based on contrasting two closely related language models is highly accurate at separating human-generated and machine-generated text. Based on this mechanism, we propose a novel LLM detector that only requires simple calculations using a pair of pre-trained LLMs. The method, called Binoculars, achieves state-of-the-art accuracy without any training data. It is capable of spotting machine text from a range of modern LLMs without any model-specific modifications. We comprehensively evaluate Binoculars on a number of text sources and in varied situations. Over a wide range of document types, Binoculars detects over 90% of generated samples from ChatGPT (and other LLMs) at a false positive rate of 0.01%, despite not being trained on any ChatGPT data.

3. Democratizing AI: Open-source Scalable LLM Training on GPU-based Supercomputers

   Siddharth Singh, Prajwal Singhania, Aditya Ranjan, John Kirchenbauer, Jonas Geiping, Yuxin Wen, Neel Jain, Abhimanyu Hans, Manli Shu, Aditya Tomar, and 2 more authors

   In 2024 SC24: International Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and Analysis SC, Nov 2024

   Abs

   Training and fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) with hundreds of billions to trillions of parameters requires tens of thousands of GPUs, and a highly scalable software stack. In this work, we present a novel four-dimensional hybrid parallel algorithm implemented in a highly scalable, portable, open-source framework called AxoNN. We describe several performance optimizations in AxoNN to improve matrix multiply kernel performance, overlap non-blocking collectives with computation, and performance modeling to choose performance optimal configurations. These have resulted in unprecedented scaling and peak flop/s (bf16) for training of GPT-style transformer models on Perlmutter (620.1 Petaflop/s), Frontier (1.381 Exaflop/s) and Alps (1.423 Exaflop/s). While the abilities of LLMs improve with the number of trainable parameters, so do privacy and copyright risks caused by memorization of training data, which can cause disclosure of sensitive or private information at inference time. We highlight this side effect of scale through experiments that explore “catastrophic memorization,” where models are sufficiently large to memorize training data in a single pass, and present an approach to prevent it. As part of this study, we demonstrate fine-tuning of a 405-billion parameter LLM using AxoNN on Frontier.

2023

1. Cramming: Training a Language Model on a Single GPU in One Day.

   Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein

   In Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, Jul 2023

   Abs

   Recent trends in language modeling have focused on increasing performance through scaling, and have resulted in an environment where training language models is out of reach for most researchers and practitioners. While most in the community are asking how to push the limits of extreme computation, we ask the opposite question: How far can we get with a single GPU in just one day? We investigate the downstream performance achievable with a transformer-based language model trained completely from scratch with masked language modeling for a single day on a single consumer GPU. Aside from re-analyzing nearly all components of the pretraining pipeline for this scenario and providing a modified pipeline with performance close to BERT, we investigate why scaling down is hard, and which modifications actually improve performance in this scenario. We provide evidence that even in this constrained setting, performance closely follows scaling laws observed in large-compute settings. Through the lens of scaling laws, we categorize a range of recent improvements to training and architecture and discuss their merit and practical applicability (or lack thereof) for the limited compute setting. We provide code to reproduce all experiments at github.com/JonasGeiping/cramming .

2. A Watermark for Large Language Models

   John Kirchenbauer, Jonas Geiping, Yuxin Wen, Jonathan Katz, Ian Miers, and Tom Goldstein

   In Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, Jul 2023

   Abs

   Potential harms of large language models can be mitigated by watermarking model output, i.e., embedding signals into generated text that are invisible to humans but algorithmically detectable from a short span of tokens. We propose a watermarking framework for proprietary language models. The watermark can be embedded with negligible impact on text quality, and can be detected using an efficient open-source algorithm without access to the language model API or parameters. The watermark works by selecting a randomized set of "green" tokens before a word is generated, and then softly promoting use of green tokens during sampling. We propose a statistical test for detecting the watermark with interpretable p-values, and derive an information-theoretic framework for analyzing the sensitivity of the watermark. We test the watermark using a multi-billion parameter model from the Open Pretrained Transformer (OPT) family, and discuss robustness and security.

2021

1. Stochastic Training Is Not Necessary for Generalization

   Jonas Geiping, Micah Goldblum, Phil Pope, Michael Moeller, and Tom Goldstein

   In International Conference on Learning Representations, Sep 2021

   Abs

   It is widely believed that the implicit regularization of SGD is fundamental to the impressive generalization behavior we observe in neural networks. In this work, we demonstrate that...